ABSTRACT In complex Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) application systems, there may exist a variety of functional sub-systems which provide divergent services to the users and the relationship among these services could be strong, which is evidently very common in practice. As one such IoT application, the smart city is designed to use intelligent services in an environment where transport, environment, energy, living, governance, and civic components are integrated to operate the city in a smart and efficient manner. Surprisingly, however, the current state-of-the-art on blockchain does not show the progress on diversified services of the complex IIoT applications. This paper tends to fill the gap and presents a scalable block graph platform and consensus protocol for the complex IIoT applications by adopting the limited resources of IIoT devices. The platform and consensus protocol are generic in the sense that they can support any practical service. The directed acyclic graph represents a significant exhibition in improving the scalability of blockchains and supports our proposed consensus protocol in substance; moreover, the detailed syntax of the block graph is defined. The consensus protocol is showed to be secure against disloyal voting, sybil attack, and 51% attack. The real use case of smart city demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The success of Bitcoin [1] and related cryptocurrencies proves that the technology of blockchain has attracted enormous attention of both researchers and practitioners from both academia and industry. The Blockchain is a revolution in technology invention, its decentralized and distributed design prevents the risk of the current centralized approaches, including the crisis of trust (such as fraud, money laundering and tampering) [2] . However, as the number of participating nodes and transactions increases, the scalability of blockchains becomes significant. Average transaction rates of Bitcoin and Ethereum have been limited to below 10 (actually 3 to 7) transactions per second (txps). Choices of parameters of the existing protocols (e.g., the block size or proof-ofwork difficulty) may have a limited effect on the throughput of blockchains. However, the thorough improvement requires the re-engineering of underlying protocols.
for the next industrial revolution. An IIoT system includes sensors, industrial machines, IoT software platforms, network servers and applications. Supply chain is an important area of application for IIoT [6] . In the process of transportation, it is necessary to ensure that materials are under monitoring [8] . In application of industry, supply chains have been extensively discussed, and in fact, a huge number of them have been in development [9] .
Some ongoing blockchain projects focus on establishing blockchain-as-a-service (BaaS) platforms [7] . For instance, Modum.io AG is the pioneer to introduce blockchain technology to pharma supply chain in Switzerland [4] . In order to assess the temperature and notify senders and recipients, they introduce the blockchain technology to the pharma production, with smart contracts automatically evaluated during the transportation. Minciardi et al. [10] proposes a model of ''smart home'' based on blockchain and self-executing smart contracts. With IoT sensors working on the network, users achieve to control household appliances.
The devices of IIoT generate, process, and exchange vast amounts of security data, and hence are appealing targets of cyber attacks [11] . Consequently, the technology of blockchain has the potential to overcome the aforementioned challenge. Blockchain platforms ensures that IIoT devices can call the origin and terminate status of goods by timestamps as a proof of packing and delivery. The application of blockchain can accurately predict the delivery time of goods. In addition, the integration of IIoT and blockchain provides the trust relationship between production networks and controlling platforms.
B. DIVERSIFIED SERVICES OF COMPLEX IIOT APPLICATIONS
In complex industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) application systems, there may exist a variety of functional sub-systems which provide divergent services to the users and the relationship among these services could be strong. This is very common in practice. Take urban utility and critical facility system as example. Figure 1 shows the details. The urban utility and critical facility system supports many critical services, including traffic flow monitoring, water supply monitoring, gas space monitoring, drainage pipeline monitoring, etc. The high volume data generated by these services would be used or processed by different users, such as police department, emergency office, bureaus of traffic, water supply, drainage, gas, power supply, heating, communication, urban council, etc.
Surprisingly, however, current state-of-the-art on blockchain does not show the progress on diversified services of complex IIoT applications. The paper tends to fill the gap and presents scalable block graph platform and consensus protocol for complex IIoT applications by adopting the limited resources of IIoT devices. The proposed platform and consensus protocol are generic in the sense that they can support any practical services. Example of an IIoT network -a Smart City monitoring system. In this model, we suppose several common monitoring agencies (actually the quantity is not limited). These agencies are working for corresponding service, communicating in the engineering operation monitoring network. The monitoring services depend on NB-IoT to participate in communication, in order to reduce deployment costs.
C. SCALABLE BLOCK GRAPH
Compared with mining nodes in cryptocurrencies, IoT devices, such as sensors, feature limited computing ability. It is difficult and uneconomic for IoT devices to strengthen computing power. Thus, it is infeasible to improve scalability by focusing on IoT devices. There are four main methods purposed to improve scalability of blockchainDirected Acyclic Graph, Sharding, Sidechain and Lightning Network. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) can be introduced to represent a distributed ledger with a peer-to-peer network. The nodes represent blocks while the edges represent the trust relationship between them [12] . DAG is well-adapted with IoT environment in IOTA, which is an open-source distributed ledger built to empower the future of the IoT. Instead of a chain-like structure, there is a graph called tangle, which is a legder to store transactions and their connections to historical records. However, research on the application of DAG to blockchain is currently at an early stage. A main problem is that the response time of DAG-based distributed ledger will be extended surprisingly as the system continues to run for some time, which may not satisfy the reliability simultaneously [12] - [14] .
In a directed graph G, if there is a directed path P a b from block b to a, we say that b approves a and a is the parent of b. If there does not exist a directed path from b to a, but a path of length at least two from b to a can be found in the graph, we say that b indirectly approves a and b is the descendant of a. A graph with no cycles is called the directed acyclic graph. More details of DAG and its application can be found in [15] .
DAG is a type of data structure with high complexity and uncertainty. In difference with synchronous ledger such as traditional blockchain, the asynchronous structure is realized in a directed acyclic graph. All the nodes in a peer-to-peer network can issue transactions by packaging them into blocks. Obviously, a developed DAG consists of quantities of blocks and a complex network of relationships between them. The VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. An example of the peer-to-peer network with two types of nodes. All the nodes in the network can communicate with others equally. It should be mentioned that, the status of nodes is variable with the in and out of the committee members. measure of DAG ensures that it is difficult for an adversary to tamper with the transactions in the graph, for the reason that the in-degrees and out-degrees of blocks should be modified.
In directed acyclic graphs, a block should be with smaller size than that of traditional blockchains. In IOTA, the user who wants to issue transactions also needs to complete the proof-of-work process on its own, instead of a miner. The reason for this design is that the computing power of IoT devices is slightly weaker than that of PCs.
In this paper, we present a novel scalable IIoT block graph platform and consensus protocol. We introduce the ''committee'' to ensure that the proof-of-stake voting process is reliable. The introduction of checkpoint blocks ensure that the transactions verified by IoT devices are considered valid. We assume that the IIoT network consists of two types of nodes with different functions-basic nodes and advanced nodes (see the coming section for more details).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the detailed design of the block graph framework. Section III assumes the behaviors of adversaries and analyzes the security against attacks. Section IV demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposal by the use case of smart city. Section V illustrates the experimental evaluation and provides the recommended values. Section VI presents the related work of our research.
II. FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL
In this section, we describe the proposed scalable block graph platform, including network composition, block graph design, consensus protocol and forking. We define the structure of transactions and blocks, provides the introduction of the consensus protocol, and describe the method of dealing with leaf nodes by introducing the mechanism of committees.
Furthermore, we analyze the probability of forks and propose the methods to handle it.
A. INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS ENVIRONMENT
We suppose a service-concentrated Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) network, including two types of nodesthe nodes with normal behavior (issuing transactions) are defined as basic nodes (IoT devices such as sensors or vehicle locators), while the ones in the committees refer to advanced nodes (see below for the introduction of committees). An example of the peer-to-peer network can be seen in Figure 2 . The heterogeneous network is composed of different IoT devices with diversified types of services. However, compared with the bitcoin network, IIoT devices usually hold limited computing power and data processing ability. Therefore, the blockchain platform should reduce the pressure of IIoT devices.
B. CONTENTS OF BLOCK GRAPH 1) TRANSACTIONS
The data composition of a transaction is illustrated in Table 1 . The detailed information of a transaction includes the version number of system, the hash value of receiver's public key (i.e., the address), the signature of sender and the transaction output. It is worth mentioning that, the length of the output is variable, where the size of it is 0 to 1,024 bits. At the initial stage of the system, the first transaction of the genesis block is called the coinbase transaction, without a signature, address or any output component.
2) BLOCKS
The sender of a transaction should also complete a proofof-work (PoW) process. Since there are no miners in the network, the difficulty of proof-of-work should be adapted to IIoT devices. In our design, the block includes the contents of the transaction, the corresponding service number, a timestamp, target and nonce values. The detailed composition of a block is illustrated in Table 2 .
At the issue stage of a block, the sender should firstly choose two blocks to approve, thus the length of prev_hash is 64 bits. However, at the initial stage of the system, there are not enough parents blocks in the graph to be referenced, the system should create a certain number of blocks that reference to one previous block, instead of two. In this case, the prev_hash of these genesis blocks are semi-empty.
C. CONSENSUS PROTOCOL
The proposed consensus protocol is the integration of proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS). We mention that Ethereum's Casper FFG (also named ''Vitalik's Casper'') [17] [18] applies a similar trick in spirit. In this protocol, we focus on the ''checkpoint blocks'', instead of each common block. At the development period of the system, the genesis block is generated. Besides, an appointing committee should be organized. Members of the committee should pay the deposit at first, where the amount of it should be subject to the actual situation. The deposit serves as a guarantee of honest behavior. Members need to vote to decide the final winner of the fork. A voting period is called epoch. However, at the interval between two rounds of voting, we don't pay much attention to the possible forks.
It is worth mentioning that, members of the appointing committee also have the permission to issue transactions as other nodes in the network, they only exercise the voting rights at the justified checkpoint. In the voting process (i.e., the end of an epoch), members should decide that which checkpoint block is considered to be the main graph, they use ballots to announce their choices. The result of the vote will be broadcast on the whole network. If a checkpoint block BCP 1 gets more than 2/3 ballots of the whole committee, the block will be acknowledged as ''prepared'', at this time the epoch ends. The incompatible transactions, along with the transactions that are in leaf blocks paralleling to key blocks (called floating transactions), will be released to the pool and wait for further process. In the next recursion, if the checkpoint block BCP 2 (of course it is the descendant of BCP 1 ) is voted as prepared, BCP 1 will be immediately considered as ''committed'', which is finally confirmed. An example of the system model is showed in Figure 3 .
The design of consensus also refers to Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT). We establish a connecting organization of nodes, which is the appointing committee, then let them vote on the validity of blocks as the message to broadcast with confirmation twice. The reason for adding a ''commit'' process is that, in fact, the network latency may cause the ''prepare'' process not to be in the view of some nodes.
Thus, a significant problem appears: how to deal with leaf blocks that are parallel to key blocks? In IIoT environment, we don't expect IoT devices to hold a strong computing power, and the system should be responsible for transactions that they create. We introduce another committee, whose members focus on dealing with floating transactions, called gathering committee. Same as appointing committee, a node who wants to join it should pay deposit to the system, and use ballots to declare that which connection scheme is their favorite.
After appointing committee completes its mission, gathering committee will face the problem of dealing with floating transactions. We consider this situation: suppose that there are n floating transactions needed to be connected to the graph once again, however, since every normal block has two parents, there are m different methods for these floating transactions to connect with the checkpoint. Thus we have:
Obviously, n and m are exponentially related, if n reaches a certain order of magnitude, the gathering committee will take a long time to find the best plan. We consider putting blocks in line with timestamp, i.e., the blocks with early timestamp will be placed first. An example of description is showed in Figure 4 . Detailed rules are as follows:
(i) If n < 3, each floating block has only one parent, which is the checkpoint block. In this case the plan is unique: there are only leaf nodes connecting to checkpoint block;
(ii) If n ≥ 3, then all the floating blocks are arranged by timestamp, the system randomly generates two plans for the gathering committee to vote, but should ensure that the later block cannot be the parent of the earlier block. The plan which successfully gets more than half of the ballots will be acknowledged as the final result.
If a member wants to depart the committee, in this case the system should refund the deposit. However, the last block he voted for prepared may not get the same number of ballots as before to be committed. For example, if the appointing committee has 12 members, a checkpoint block should get 8 ballots to be prepared. If there were 5 members declaring to depart the committee, without new members supplementing the committee, the block would never get 8 ballots to be committed. Thus, a member should be responsible for a checkpoint block till the end. For example, if he wants to leave the committee after the checkpoint BCP i , firstly he should declare to quit at checkpoint BCP i−2 , then he should vote a checkpoint block BCP i−1 as prepared, and also, vote it as committed when BCP i comes to be prepared. Simply speaking, he does not need to make a decision on BCP i , but should be responsible for the previous checkpoint block. Detailed explanation can be seen in Figure 5 .
If a node wants to join the appointing committee, he ought to pay the deposit specified by the system. Since the number FIGURE 5. Example of a member of appointing committee who intends to leave. First he should declare his decision before checkpoint BCP n−1 (for example, at BCP n−2 ). When appointing committee has to vote at BCP n−1 , he should vote as well, at next checkpoint he just has to vote previous checkpoint block as ''committed'', then exit.
FIGURE 6.
Example of a fork. In the first round no one gets more than 2/3 ballots, B p and B r exists as the top two blocks; in the second round B p+1 wins as prepared, thus Bp is committed, being acknowledged as main graph. In the third round B p+2 is voted to be prepared, thus B p+1 is committed.
of committee members has changed, the number of votes of a block to be prepared will also be different from previous checkpoint. The new member also doesn't need to care about old checkpoints, he will just focus on the new blocks. Thus, if at the same time, the exit and joining of the member occur, the committee can still function normally.
D. HANDLING FORKS
An epoch is based on the timestamp. Suppose that there exists an epoch EP i , at the end of the previous epoch EP i−1 , the appointing committee should vote on the new checkpoint block. Initially the system should find the block that has the maximum path length from the previous checkpoint to itself. If there are multiple maximum length blocks (i.e., the pending voted blocks are not unique), the committee then faces multiple voting options. If the result of vote is that not any block gets more than 2/3 ballots, the top two blocks will still exist as usual, waiting for the next epoch EP i+1 to come. If a descendant of any block wins at the next round of vote, the parent will be acknowledged as committed. In spite of the fork, the permitting of previous checkpoint before fork is unaffected. See Figure 6 for a detailed example.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss how 51% attack is prevented and provide analysis of committee member behavior. We begin by declaring several assumptions. Suppose that all the nodes in the IIoT network are divided into two types: basic nodes and advanced nodes. It should be worth mentioning that, all the nodes are basic nodes in default, if a node wants to pay deposit to enter the committee (both two), he will update to be FIGURE 7. Example of a malicious node's disloyal voting. The node votes for B p as prepared, thus at next epoch he should have voted for B p+1 as prepared to verify B p to be committed, but he votes for the competing block B q+1 , leading the phenomenon that both two blocks still continue to exist. In this case if the node has voted disloyal ballots twice, he will be punished for his behavior.
an advanced node. A basic node may own a large amount of token, but has no intention to enter the committee; in contrast, a node may also put all the token invested in committee, without participate in trading. Thus the division of nodes is a dynamic concept.
A. DISLOYAL VOTING
We analyze the behavior of appointing committee members. Under normal circumstances, we hope that all the members are responsible, in which case their votes are conducive to the normal work of system. However, if some of these IIoT devices are destroyed or directly controlled by adversaries, their behavior may tend to be unpredictable. For instance, if a malicious node votes for the block B p as prepared, but the block does not get 2/3 of the total ballots, it will continue to exist in parallel with another competing block B q . In the next round of voting, the malicious node deliberately votes for the subsequent checkpoint block of B q (i.e., B q+1 ), then this behavior is considered to be disloyal to B p . If a member of the committee has voted disloyal ballots more than twice, the system should punish him for his behavior. Specific operation can be a forfeiture of his deposit, deporting him from the appointing committee. An example of a disloyal voting is showed in Figure 7 .
There is another situation, which can be thought as a variant of disloyal voting. A committee member may vote on blocks that finally lose the competition, which is a normal behavior. Occasionally, the wrong vote may be due to the network delay of an honest node (e.g., the node did not see another competing block), or he does believe that the failed block should have been the main chain. However, if he repeatedly votes for the loser blocks, his behavior will be suspected of being malicious. The probability that an honest node makes multiple mistakes is minimal (if an honest node makes this mistake, he will also be punished as well for his incompetence). Meanwhile, we don't ask gathering committee members for that honesty behavior, for the reason that the vote result of floating blocks does not affect the security of system.
B. SYBIL ATTACK
Suppose that an adversary wants to launch a sybil attack. At first he should create a large number of malicious nodes. In other words, they exist in the form of multiple pseudonyms, but are actually controlled by the same malicious adversary -a node that owns multiple identities. In IIoT environment, the defense method of sybil attack is to establish an identity authentication mechanism, that is, an IoT device who wants to join the network must be authenticated by a reliable third party -Certificate Authority (CA). On the other hand, proofof-work is introduced to the platform to increase the cost of sybil attack by adversaries. If a node wants to issue a transaction, he should get a nonce that makes the hash value smaller than the target. This process requires a certain amount of time, if an adversary with multiple pseudonyms injects a large number of invalid transactions at the same time, he has to spend time on finding nonces. Although the difficulty of proof-of-work is relatively easier than cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, it is an effective way to prevent malicious behaviors.
C. 51% ATTACK
If a malicious adversary wants to launch attack by occupying 51% of computing power on the whole network, he should either deliberately create a large number of leaf blocks in the graph, or make the appointing committee vote according to his wishes. In the first case, this kind of attack is not feasible. Despite the fact that leaf blocks make the graph divergence, appointing committee members only vote for blocks that they believe are credible, leading these leaf blocks invalid. Follow-up work is how to deal with these floating blocks. As described above, gathering committee is responsible for rearranging these floating blocks. The system randomly provides two plans for gathering committee to vote. Assume that the adversary controls more than 51% of the members, these malicious members can only vote for the arrangement they prefer, but the behavior has no security impact on the system.
IV. IIoT USE CASE OVERVIEW
In this section, we discuss the use case of our framework in Industrial Internet of Things. As described in Section I, block graph can be introduced to the IIoT environment, for the reason that IIoT devices feature limited computing power. In this paper, we focus on the use case of a smart city. A smart city is a typical use of IIoT, which is designed to use intelligent services in an environment where transport, environment, energy, living, governance and civic components are integrated to operate the city in a smart and efficient manner. In this structure, IIoT devices under each urban service can issue transactions on the block graph platform. The definition of ''transaction'' is not singly limited in cryptocurrency trading, furthermore, can be a completion of urban services. In difference from service-oriented IoT network [16] , our framework is service-concentrated, gathering all the services in a city that need to interact with each other. Although smart city is a stereoscopic concept, urban services are related from the air to the underground, they are all flat in the block graph platform.
A. SERVICE LAYER
In a smart city, a water service provider (e.g., water supply bureau) who has transported water to the designated destination, the result of a successful transportation is . summarized as a transaction -including starting and arrival time, origin place, destination, water volume, etc. The transaction is then encapsulated into a block, and will be issued to the block graph. A power generation service provider also sends a block with a transaction including the address of power plant, power generation, timestamp, etc. After those blocks are issued to the block graph, the heating plant uses part of the residual heat from the power plant to heat the water produced by the water supply plant to provide heating services. As a result, the completion of a heating service is summarized as a block in the graph.
Despite the fact that most of the diversified services are not directly connected, in the block graph, the service providers are all connected through transaction verification. Therefore, a service provider that has no connection with a service corresponding to a block will also verify the transaction in it. The verification focuses on whether the transaction has been issued before.
B. COMMITTEE LAYER
In the IIoT environment, collaboration between different services requires a manager to implement. In our model, managers refer to committee members (both appointing and gathering), in reality, are corresponding to the role of the government departments.
It is worth mentioning that, not only is the government eligible to serve on the committee, any user who is able to pay the deposit can apply for joining the committee, either appointing or gathering. If a node at service layer enters the committee, he will also enter the committee layer and vice versa. The users holding large numbers of tokens are more eager to develop the system in a good direction, which is the original intention of a proof-of-stake design.
An example of a smart city is showed in Figure 8 . In this network structure, the government does not need to focus on all the services of the whole city, it just has to vote on the specified checkpoint. Likewise, the one who is interested in dealing with floating blocks can join in the gathering committee by paying deposit, regardless of its identity.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we measure the average transaction throughput and the ratio of valid blocks. The design of experiment refers to the model of Blockclique [19] , including various of parameters (see Table 3 ).
We implement the experiment in Python and compare the throughput of transactions in different network latencies FIGURE 8. Example of a ''Smart City'' use case of block graph. In this case, the three services -power, water supply and heating -collaborate through block graph. The government plays the role of an appointing committee member. Also, the administration bureau plays the role of a gathering committee member, he is responsible for floating blocks. (0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2s). We simulate the proof-of-work process by modifying the average time between blocks (t b ). We also calculate the rate of valid blocks in different groups of simulation. The measurement period for each experiment t p is 180 seconds.
A. RATE OF VALID BLOCKS
We also count the number of valid and invalid blocks in our experiment. In our experiment, invalid blocks are those who include transactions that have been verified before, and the voting time for committees is negligible. We measure the valid rate in order to provide a recommended value of t b . Figure 9 presents the valid rate of blocks under different network latencies. The line charts demonstrate that the network latency has a limited impact on valid rate, but we can still draw conclusion that t b should be greater than 4 seconds, for the reason that the valid rate tends to be stable. Combining with the previous set of line charts, we can provide a recommended value that t b ≥ 4s.
B. TRANSACTION THROUGHPUT
At the start of this experiment, the two genesis blocks are generated. Figure 10 shows the average throughput in the ideal case, without network latency. Obviously, the throughput of transactions is inversely proportional to the average time between blocks. Considering the network latency that often occurs in actual situations, we also did four sets of comparative experiments, with the average network latency l values from 0.01 to 0.2 seconds.
It should be noted that, we have not only measured the throughput by altering the average time between blocks, but also changed the average number of transactions in one block (n t ). We believe that by expanding the size of blocks, the recommended value of t b is more easily to be found. Specifically, the comprehensive efficiency E is calculated as
× n t , where M and m respectively stand for the number of total and invalid blocks. The value of n t should be determined in the actual application, and in our experiment, we take 2t b as an example. Thus, E can be considered as the actual transaction throughput of the system. Figure 11 illustrates the performance of system taking network latency into account. Obviously, as the network latency grows, the total number of transactions during one measurement period drops. If t b is less than 4 seconds (meaning that the difficulty of proof-of-work is low), the network latency has a significant impact on transaction throughput. When t b is greater than 4 seconds, the growth trend of E tends to be flat.
In general, compared with traditional blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, our research realizes a high throughput blockchain-based DAG structure. We measure the total number of transactions completed by each system in one . hour (3,600s) , and present the result in the form of Table 4 in order to compare the throughput of each system.
VI. RELATED WORK A. TANGLE OF IOTA
IOTA [15] is generally considered as the first cryptocurrency to introduce DAG to transaction verification. The authors discussed an innovative approach that does not fully incorporate the technology of blockchain. In this network, there is no role of miner. In difference from traditional blockchain, the smallest unit in the graph is a transaction (called the ''Tangle'') instead of a block. If a user wants to add a transaction to the ledger, he should firstly verify two transactions in the graph, then approve these two as parents. Thus, IOTA is also considered as a variant of multiple chain. The core idea of tangle is that users who want to issue transactions are also contributing to system security by approving other transactions. Meanwhile, users who issue transactions are contributing to the network's security. The users are primarily responsible for reviewing whether the transaction is in conflict with previous ones. If a transaction has enough direct or indirect paths to reach their descendants, i.e., has been approved by enough users, it will be acknowledged for reliable.
Furthermore, the developers of IOTA hope that the tangle will be developed into an efficient platform of IoT devices. Based on this desire, the project of SensorHub [20] has been running on IOTA to test the feasibility of possible use cases (such as farming, vehicle conditions, supply chains, etc.)
B. DAG WITH SHARDING
Another scheme, the Blockclique [19] , has combined directed acyclic graph and sharding. In this model, the graph is divided into a certain number of threads. Each block should approve to λ parents, where λ is the number of threads. The core idea of this design is ensuring that all the blocks are averagely assigned to each thread. The author also formulates rules of conflicts to avoid forks on the same thread.
In addition, the proposed model introduces a final parameter F to guarantee the validity of the transaction. F is not a fixed value, and needed to be proved through experiments in purpose of keeping the balance of final verification waiting time and probability of fork.
C. INDUSTRIAL IOT BLOCKCHAIN
The combination of Internet of Things and blockchain is discussed in [7] , [21] , [23] , and [24] . Zaccone et al. [6] and Mehleri et al. [25] analyze the feasibility of industrial IoT applications in blockchain. Reference [31] introduces a VOLUME 7, 2019 peer-to-peer electricity trading among electric vehicles based on blockchain. Relatedly, Dominguez-Garcia and Hadjicostis [32] introduce a consortium blockchain for secure energy trading in IIoT. The core idea of IIoT blockchains is providing high customization of production without demand of reorganization of manufacture. The system supports invocation of smart contracts in common blockchains and publication of information in IIoT network. The platform can be used to security of communication among nodes in heterogeneous network.
D. SMART CITY CONSTRUCTION
In the concept of a smart city, government is considered to be a manager of a smart city. Reference [26] introduces an affair service platform for government. As a discussion of services, [27] proposes a solution for charging and discharging services in a smart grid. Reference [28] analyzes initiatives of open data in a smart city.
When it comes to blockchain, [30] focuses on solving the sensors data storage problems and management using a blockchain network. The design of [29] is interested in an efficient and scalable distributed architecture in a smart city. The property of scalable is mainly achieved by Software Defined Networking (SDN). In addition, a proof-of-work for memory aims to ensure security and privacy and avoid information tampering by adversaries.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The current development of industrial Internet of Things is still in its infancy. In terms of operation, the IIoT network totally depends on a centralized system, with a trusted third party to ensure the security of network. We are interested in how to improve the transaction throughput of an IoT blockchain, thus, we focus on the method of directed acyclic graph. In this paper, we introduce a DAG platform of IIoT, the block graph. We introduce the improvement of blockchain technology into IIot, and propose the use case including diversified services of complex IIoT applications on block graph platform.
The main contribution of our research is to propose a block graph framework that improves traditional blockchains. A service-concentrated design ensures that the framework can support any practical service. The scalability of the block graph can be achieved by modifying the average time between blocks (i.e., the difficulty of a proof-of-work process). The introduction of committees is based on proofof-stake. In addition, the verification of blocks relies on the consensus protocol of voting system. We provide a recommended value of time between blocks by the experiment result.
The shortcoming of this paper is that the experiment does not fully simulate the voting process. We ignore the voting time spent in the experiment and the selection of the committee at the initial stage. However, choices of the committee are currently not well implemented in both academia and industry. For example, the casper of Ethereum has not yet been fully developed.
Discussions of future work include improving the credit system of nodes, combining the voting functions of the two committees, and analyzing the impact of voting time on system performance. A credit system of nodes in the network has been discussed in [33] . The admission of the committee requires not only a deposit, but also a certain level of credit. We believe that a distributed ledger requires a script that records the credit history of all nodes. The functions of committees focus on forks and floating blocks, and we are considering merging the functions of the two committees and streamlining the number of members. We have assumed that the voting time of committees is ignored in our experiment for simplicity. In practice, however, system efficiency will be affected by voting time. We will study how to guarantee the correct voting result during communication in a peer-to-peer network.
